A10 X-forwarded-for Review

A malicious client sends an HTTP request directly to your A10 with a forged header: GET /admin HTTP/1.1 X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1

When a client connects to an A10 VIP (Virtual IP), the A10 establishes a separate TCP connection to the backend server. From the server’s perspective, the source IP of every single packet is the A10’s own LAN IP—not the remote user. This breaks logging, geo-location, rate-limiting, and security rules.

If your backend server reads only the first IP (leftmost) as the client, it will believe the request is coming from 127.0.0.1 (localhost)—bypassing all ACLs. a10 x-forwarded-for

X-Forwarded-For: <client>, <proxy1>, <proxy2>

When configured for L7 load balancing (HTTP mode), the A10 ADC rewrites the HTTP request headers before forwarding the packet to the real server. It typically appends the original client IP address to the existing XFF header. A malicious client sends an HTTP request directly

A10 provides a configuration option to prevent this. Instead of appending, you can configure the ADC to or replace the XFF header.

Unlike XFF, which is HTTP-specific, PROXY Protocol prepends a binary header at the transport layer. It preserves the original client IP for any protocol—HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or raw TCP. If your backend server supports PROXY Protocol (e.g., HAProxy, Nginx, Apache 2.4.30+), this is a more robust solution than XFF. X-Forwarded-For on A10 Networks devices is a powerful but subtle tool. When configured correctly—preferably with replace mode to block spoofing—it restores end-to-end visibility. However, it shifts responsibility to the backend developer to parse headers securely. If your backend server reads only the first

In the CLI: