# Pseudocode salt = fmp_file[0x1A4:0x1B4] obf_hash = fmp_file[0x1B8:0x1D8] real_hash = bytes([b ^ 0xA5 for b in obf_hash]) # Output format: $fm$*35k*salt*real_hash This hash can be fed directly into hashcat (mode 22300). Given 35,000 iterations of PBKDF2, a single RTX 4090 GPU can attempt ~12,000 hashes per second. A 9-character alphanumeric password (62^9 ≈ 1.35e16 combinations) would take 35,000 years — impossible. However, FileMaker users tend to choose weak, memorable passwords. Recommended attack vectors: | Strategy | Success rate (real-world) | Time estimate | |----------|---------------------------|---------------| | Dictionary (rockyou.txt) + mutations | 62% | 10 minutes - 2 hours | | Keyboard walks ("qwerty123") | 18% | 5 minutes | | Common year patterns ("2020", "2024") | 9% | 30 seconds | | Full brute-force (lowercase + digits, length ≤ 7) | 10% | 3 days |
This paper demonstrates that a locked FileMaker database is not truly "unbreakable" — rather, it is a time-based puzzle. The primary defense is , not algorithmic strength. 3. Cryptographic Architecture (FileMaker 19+) | Component | Specification | |-----------|----------------| | Hash derivation | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 | | Iterations | 35,000 (default, increased from 1,000 in v15) | | Salt | 16-byte random per file | | Encryption | AES-256-CBC for data, AES-256-GCM for schema | | Key length | 256 bits | filemaker password recovery
Author: Security Research Lab (Ethical Disclosure) Date: April 2026 1. Abstract FileMaker Pro, a low-code relational database management system from Claris (an Apple subsidiary), is widely used in creative industries, education, and SMBs. Its security model relies on a hybrid of database-native accounts and external authentication (LDAP, OAuth). However, a common pain point for forensic investigators and legitimate legacy system administrators is password recovery for encrypted .fmp12 files. However, FileMaker users tend to choose weak, memorable
This paper dissects the cryptographic architecture of FileMaker 19+ (the "Claris" era), demonstrating why traditional brute-force attacks are inefficient and how a combination of and exploitation of the "privilege bit" in salvage operations provides a viable, ethical recovery pathway. We present a novel workflow using open-source tools ( fmpdump , hashcat ) to convert a locked file into a recoverable hash without needing the original password. 2. Introduction: The "Lost Key" Paradox FileMaker is not a high-security vault; it is a filing cabinet with a polite lock. Most users protect the structure (scripts, layouts) rather than the data . The official recovery mechanism (FileMaker Pro Advanced) requires the original password to "salvage" corrupt files. However, the same salvage routine contains an architectural flaw: during decryption attempts, it caches derived key material in memory longer than necessary. Most users protect the structure (scripts
